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SYMPOSIUM
The Wanted Gaze: Accountability for Interpersonal
Conduct at Work
ANITA L. ALLEN*
INTRODUCTION
I would like to make two points by way of comment on Jeffrey Rosen's book, The

Unwanted Gaze: The Destruction of Privacy in America. 1 The first point is that the
destruction of privacy in America is threatened by "wanted" as well as "unwanted
gazes."2 The second point is that in the context of the workplace, accountability for
interpersonal conduct justifies subjecting employees to unwanted gazes.
l. OUR VOLU:-ITARISM
In the United States today, it is common to think of privacy as a good thing,
both for individuals and for society. Americans think of privacy as connected to
dignity, freedom, and good government. But is it also common to think that
privacy is something that individuals may forego at will. Privacy rights con
ferred by social norms and law are, for the most part, deemed waivable and
commercially alienable. Thus, if someone chooses to sit in front of her window
reading or watching television all day where she can be observed by others, we
have no grounds for concern or complaint about her privacy-waiving conduct.
Similarly, we have no grounds for concern or complaint if curious neighbors
exploit privacy waivers and observe one another sitting in front of their open
windows. We tolerate commercial alienability of privacy as well as uncompen
sated waivers: One is permitted to sell to a publishing firm an article in which
one reveals intimacies that are otherwise protected by the intrusion or public
disclosure tore and the Fifth Amendment;4 one can work in what is euphemisti
cally called the "adult entertainment" industry as a dancer or actor, revealing
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2. Cf Anita L. Allen, Coercing Privacy, 40 WM. & MARY L. REv. 723 (1999) (arguing that if

I. JEFFREY R OSEN, THE UNwANTED GAZE: THE DESTRUCTION OF PRIVACY

Americans lose their taste for privacy and their expectations of privacy, the consequences for liberal
democracy may be dire).

3. The common law of privacy recognizes four basic privacy rights, first distinguished in William L.
Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REv. 383 (1960). The four are rights against (I) intrusion upon seclusion,
province of the "intrusion" tort; (2) publication of embarrassing private facts, province of the "public
disclosure" tort; (3) publicity placing a person in a false light; and (4) appropriation of name, likeness,
and identity. See REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 652B-652E (1977) (incorporating Prosser's basic
Prosser,

. four-fold analysis).

4.

U.S. CoNsT. amend. V ("[N]or shall any person ..

witness against himself.").
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parts of the body and intimacies that strangers would otherwise see only if they
were trespassers or peeping toms. The optional, waivable, and alienable charac
ter of privacy is reflected in current thinking about the new economy

as

well. We

seem to think that privacy is well protected in cyberspace so long as e-businesses post
privacy policies and more or less stick to them; it is left to the consumer to decide
how much information to give, share, sell, or simply leave unsecured.
Our prevailing conception of privacy is thus voluntarist. We have a right to
give up privacy if we want to and a duty to respect the privacy other people
want, but we have no duty to be private or to respect the privacy people do not
want. We believe privacy is respected by our society, even if individuals choose
to waive and alienate much of their privacy, so long as their acts of waiver or
alienation are fully consensual and informed.
II. NoNVOLUNTARisM IN TRADITIONAL JEWISH LAw
According to two recent interpreters, Jeffrey Rosen and Wendy Shalit, the
conceptions of privacy reflected in medieval and traditional Jewish law have
relevance for secular America today. Rosen's and Shalit's claims of contempo
rary relevance are striking because the conceptions of privacy they attribute to
the Jewish tradition are distinctly nonvoluntarist. Could it be that Jewish law is
an implicit critique of contemporary U.S. voluntarism? Could it be that the
dominant, voluntarist conception of privacy is too dominant? Answering in the
affirmative to these two questions, Shalit employs Jewish law precisely to
criticize U.S. voluntarism. By contrast, Rosen employs Jewish law as persua
sive authority for robust privacy protection in contemporary America. Yielding
to modem libertarian impulses, Rosen falls short of embracing the nonvolunta
rist dimension of the Jewish law he cites.

5
In her book, A Return to Modesty: Discovering the Lost Virtue, Wendy Shalit

invokes Jewish law prohibiting exposure of the intimate to develop a criticism
of contemporary American culture. Shalit reports becoming interested in tradi
tions of sexual modesty after seeing an old photograph in which a young Jewish
couple stood side by side, but without touching or looking at one another.6 The
Jewish law of tzniut required that the body of an unmarried woman remain
unseen and untouched, even by her fiance.7 Respect for a woman requires that
she not be subjected to (or treated to!) physical intimacy, even if she herself
desires a lover's touch. Again, privacy cannot be waived.
Wendy Shalit's book is so provocative and curious precisely because it goes
against the mainstream of privacy voluntarism. Shalit argues for the resurrection
of sexual modesty, defined as premarital virginity and chastity, as a respected
virtue for women. Shalit, a twenty-something, upper middle class, college
educated, self-described feminist, wants young women to want modesty (for

5. WENDY SHALIT, A RETURN TO MODESTY: DISCOVERING THE LOST VIRTiiE (2000).
6. ld. at 3.
7.

/d.
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moral and prudential reasons) and wants parents and others to impose rules and
expectations consistent with sexual modesty. Shalit believes, in effect, that
norms mandating unwanted privacy are a good thing. At least in the moral
domain, privacy should not be deemed wholly optional and voluntary.
In The Unwanted Gaze, Jeffrey Rosen describes a concept from Jewish law,
hezzek re 'iyyah, defined as the injury caused by seeing or the injury caused by
being seen.8 According to Rosen, under traditional Jewish law it was an offense
to individuals and their community to observe others' intimacies: " 'To what
ever extent the unwanted gaze establishes its sway [over the private domain of
another], there is injury, because the damage caused by the gaze has no
measure.'

"9

Moreover, under medieval Jewish law it was also an offense to

cause or permit one's own intimacies to be observed. Thus, "a window overlook
ing a common courtyard had to be removed, even if the individual whose
privacy was violated failed to protest."10 Although the Jewish law recognized
the individual's power to waive or alienate ordinary rights of property, the
individual lacked the power to waive or alienate certain rights of privacy. As
Rosen explains, "[O]ne is not permitted to 'breach the fences of Israel' or act
immodestly so as to cause the Divine presence (Shekhinah) to depart from
Israel." 11 Some forms of privacy cannot be waived or alienated because at stake
in losses of such privacy is even more than individuals' "constricted lives"12 or
loss of freedom of speech, conduct, and self-definition. The integrity of the
community itself is at stake.
Combining Rosen's and Shalit's observations, we learn that in Jewish law it
was a wrong, first, to invade others' privacy and, second, to be indifferent about
one's own privacy or to be an exhibitionist. The laws of hezzek re'iyyah and
tzniut define a moral tradition of thinking about privacy that is nonvoluntarist.
The Jewish tradition was nonvoluntarist in the sense that, more pervasively than
in contemporary U.S. culture, whether privacy norms have been violated does
not depend upon the will, wishes, or preferences of the individuals whose
privacies have been exposed: Persons are morally powerless to waive or alien
ate certain of their own privacies. Moreover, coercive collective authority is
properly marshaled both to protect "wanted" privacy from the "unwanted gaze"
and to protect "unwanted" privacy from the "wanted gaze." Privacy could, in
effect, be imposed on the unwilling or uninterested. The Jewish tradition
required something of both potential victims of privacy-norm violations as well
as perpetrators: I have an obligation to myself and to our community to
safeguard my privacy, and you have an obligation to me and to our community
not to violate my privacy.

8. RosEN, supra note I, at 18.
9. Jd. at 19 (alteration in original).
10. Jd.
II. Jd.
12. /d.
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III. NONVOLUNTARISM IN U.S. LAW AND SOCIETY
Under ancient Jewish law, individuals were not the sole arbiters of privacy.
Both what I have called the "wanted gaze" and what Jeffrey Rosen calls the
"unwanted gaze" were deemed problems. The ancient nonvoluntarist privacy
orientations cited by Rosen and Shalit have analogues today. In the name of
respect for privacy, we Americans sometimes worry both about the fact that
people do not have the privacy they want, and about the fact that people do not
want the privacy we believe they ought to have. A number of our actual norms,
laws, and practices go against the prevailing voluntarist conception for privacy.
For example, nonvoluntarism is at play in policies behind laws that enforce
single-sex public toilets. In a nonvoluntarist privacy regime in which urination
is defined as appropriately private conduct, the fact that a person is indifferent
to privacy or is an exhibitionist does not mean it is morally permissible to peek
into his bathroom window and watch him use the toilet. It may be morally
impermissible for one person to watch another use the toilet and morally
impermissible for one person to intentionally, knowingly, or negligently cause
or permit another to watch him use the toilet. Suppose X and Yare members of
opposite sexes, and X asks Yto accompany X into a public restroom reserved for
members of X's sex. We have rules of law that would penalize Ydespite X's lack
of modesty, apparently on the ground that most people are, or should be, modest
about toilet use (a privacy-related policy basis), in addition to the theory that
shared restrooms could lead to sex crimes and vice (a public safety and
morals-related policy basis).
In addition to the single-sex public toilets, our society has established other
practices that impose privacy. Indecent exposure laws, building codes, military
"Don't Ask, Don't Tell" rules, and professional confidentiality rules applicable
to lawyers and physicians all impose or coerce privacy. Their existence implies
that many Americans believe that certain unasked for or unwanted privacies,
including many relating to the body and sexuality, should be mandatory even
though most privacies should not. So, I can choose not to disable my cookies or
encrypt my e-mail, and I can be a guest on Oprah and describe the saga of my
hospitalization for mental illness; but I cannot sign an agreement at the start of
the attorney-client relationship waiving my right to confidential representation, I
cannot walk around New York City in the nude, I cannot disclose my lesbian
sexual orientation to my fellow naval officers, and I cannot build my house
entirely of glass.
Clearly a part of the American landscape, privacy nonvoluntarism is nonethe
less overshadowed by the pronounced voluntarism of the modern-American
liberal mainstream. The mainstream perspective is that a man can draw his
curtains and a woman can behave modestly, if they want to. They do not have to
erect privacy fences for their own sake or the community 's. The community has
no right to impose privacy and related modesty on me if I do not want it, but the
community must come to my defense if others interfere with the privacy that is
mine and I want to keep.
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IV. "WANTED GAZE" WORRIES
Privacy in America can be destroyed by failures to guard against "unwanted
gazes." However, privacy can also be destroyed by inattention to the conse
quences of "wanted gazes."
The problem of the "unwanted gaze" is addressed in law through the First,
Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Amendments, 13 through the invasion of privacy
torts, 14 and through state and federal privacy statutes.15 Nonlegal norms of

13. SeeU. S. CoNsT. amends. I, IU, IV, V, IX. These Amendments protect interests in physical and
informational privacy, but limit government access to our homes, persons, records, and ideas. The First
Amendment provides: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of
the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances." U.S.
CoNsT. amentl. I. The Third Amendment provides: "No Soldier shall, in time of peace be quartered in
any house, without the consent of the Owner, nor in time of war, but in a manner to be prescribed by
law."U. S. CONST. amend. IlL The Fourth Amendment provides: "The right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." U. S. CoNsT.
amend. IV. The Fifth Amendment provides: "[N)or shall any person . .. be compelled in any criminal
case to be a witness against himself . ... "U.S.CoNST. amend. V. The Ninth Amendment provides; "The
enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others
retained by the people. "U.S. CoNsT. amend. IX. Finally, the Fourteenth Amendment, which the Court,
in Whalen v. Roe, 429 U. S. 589 (1977), held extends to protect the confidentiality of medical
information held by state government, provides: "No State shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United states; nor shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."U.S. CoNsT. amend.XIV.
14. The invasion of privacy torts are: (1) Intrusion upon Seclusion, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OP ToRTs
§ 652B (1977) ("One who intentionally intrudes, physically or otherwise, upon the solitude or seclusion
of another or his private affairs or concerns, is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his
privacy, if the intrusion would be highly offensive to a reasonable person."); (2) Appropriation of Name
or Likeness, id. § 652 C ("One who appropriates to his own use or benefit the name or likeness of
another is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy. "); (3) Publicity Given to Private
Life, id. § 652D ("One who gives publicity to a matter concerning the private life of another is subject
to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, if the matter publicized is of a kind that (a) would be
highly offensive to a reasonable person, and (b) is not of legitimate concern to the public. "); (4)
Publicity Placing Person in False Light, id. § 652E ("One who gives publicity to a matter concerning
another that places the other before the public in a false light is subject to liability to the other for
invasion of his privacy, if (a) the false light in which the other was placed would be highly offensive to
a reasonable person, and (b) the actor had knowledge or acted in reckless disregard as to the falsity of
the publicized matter and the false light in which the other would be placed.")
15. See, e.g., Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2000) (opening government records to
the public, but containing privacy exceptions for medical, personnel, and "similar files "); Privacy Act, 5
U. S. C § 552a (2000) (mandating "fair information practices" and limiting third-party access to personal
information contained in federal records systems); Computer Matching and Privacy Protection Act, 5
U.S.C. § 552a (a)(S)-(13), (e)( l 2), (o)-(r), (u) (2000) (amending Privacy Act to regulate the practice of
sharing and comparing data about identified individuals contained in different government data banks);
Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978, 12U.S. C. §§ 3401-3422 (2000) (governing certain banking and
financial transactions); Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15U. S. C.§§ 1681-168 l t (2000) (limiting disclosures
of consumer credit information); Children's Online Privacy Protection Act of 1998, 15 U.S. C.§§ 6501-6506
(2000) (requiring that Internet sites aimed at children under thirteen receive "verifiable " parental
consent for the child's use of the site); Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 25102521 (2000) {regulating the surveillance and interception of telephone calls placed on regular tele-
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privacy also address privacy. The problem of the "wanted gaze" is addressed in
law as well. Laws that restrict nudity and obscenity impose privacy, in the sense
of requiring bodily concealment and reserved speech. The recently enacted
16
Children's Online Privacy Protection Act imposes data privacy protections on
children under thirteen, many of whom are indifferent to privacy. The "Don't
Ask, Don't Tell" policy respecting gays in the military silences gays and
lesbians who might want to share facts about their intimate lives and identities
with peers.17 Nonlegal norms of accountability to family, church, community,
and employer have dictated whether and the extent to which people are both
permitted and required to embrace various modes of privacy, solitude, seclu
sion, reserve, modesty, secrecy, confidentiality, anonymity, and so forth. Com
plex norms of etiquette impose privacy in the sense of limiting our ability to
share certain information and intimacies with others in certain contexts.
By invoking Jewish law, Rosen, like Shalit, invites us to consider privacy
from the perspective of nonvoluntarist regimes in which both the "wanted gaze"
and the "unwanted gaze" are potentially privacy problems. Yet, Rosen's book
turns out to be an especially eloquent, but in key respects, standard civil
libertarian, defense of norms that protect us from the unwanted, often technology
aided gaze of media, employers, government, and businesses. The privacy
problem of the "wanted gaze" suggested by Rosen's account of Jewish law
drops from sight after a cameo appearance.
This is unfortunate, for we have entered an era in which concern about the
"wanted gaze" may be more appropriate than ever.18 Arguably excessive volun
tary abrogation of domestic privacy and modesty traditions are the order of the
day. Moreover, exhibitionism and indifference to one's own privacy are fast
becoming fixtures of popular culture.19 Television, radio, and cyberspace are
domains in which ordinary individuals, performers, and professionals voluntar-

phones, portable phones, cellular phones, and certain communications via beepers,' e-mail, voicemail,
and faxes); Video Privacy Protection Act, 18 U.S.C § 2710 (2000) (governing access to individuals'
movie video rental records); Employee Polygraph Protection Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2001-2009 (2000)
(limiting use of polygraphs by employers); Privacy Protection Act of 1980, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000aa to
2000aa-12 (2000) (setting procedures for government access to newspapers' records and information).
16. Children's Online Privacy Protection Act of 1998 (COPPA), 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501-6506; see also

16 C.F.R. § 312 (200 I) (implementing COPPA).

17. The federal courts have upheld the policy of forcing gays and lesbians in the military into a
closet of secrecy. See Philips v. Perry, 106 F.3d 1420 (9th Cir. 1997); Able v. United States, 88 F.3d
1280 (2d Cir. 1996), appeal after remand, 155 F.3d 628 (2d Cir. 1998). Under the Uniform Code of
Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. §§ 801-940 (2000 ), homosexuals can be dishonorably discharged from
military service when their homosexuality is discovered under any one of three articles of the Code:
Article 125, which prohibits sodomy, § 925; Article 80, which prohibits attempts to commit a

punishable offense, § 880; or Article 134, which prohibits conduct of a nature to bring discredit upon
the Armed Forces, § 934.
18. Cf Allen, supra note 2, at 723 (arguing that if privacy is vital to liberal democracy, the voluntary
abrogation of privacy, if excessive, is a serious problem).
19. See, e.g., Rachel Kreisel, Reality Shows: A Form of Therapy for Viewers?, LA. TIMES, July 10,

2000, at 3; Kara G. Morrison & Michael H. Hodges, Reality 1V Bares U.S. Ugly Side: Some Say Shows
like "Survivor" Mirror Our Culture That Encourages Backstabbing, DETROIT NEws, July 12, 2000, at I.
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ily share vast amounts of personal information with viewing and listening
audiences. The "wanted gaze" problem is not merely a product of the Internet,
cell phones, and the media. People freely converse at work, and even in public
places (trains, shops, and so forth), with friends and with strangers, about the
intimate details of their lives. "Privacy, it's gone, get over it!" is how one
commentator responds to the problem of the unwanted gaze.20 "Privacy, who
cares?" and "Privacy, who needs it, if the price is right?" are the way some
people seem to be responding to the problem of the wanted gaze.
Rosen's neglect of the problem of the "wanted gaze" is unfortunate for
another reason. At the same time that our society is confronting arguably
excessive voluntary abrogations of privacy, our society is also characterized by
arguably excessive, prejudicial, and oppressive impositions of privacy. As I
have already noted, despite the U.S. penchant for thinking of privacy in
voluntarist terms, our social and legal traditions have never been strictly or
'
uniformly voluntarist. Nor has voluntary privacy been available to all under
conditions of equal opportunity. There have always been those (such as slaves,
mill workers, women, migrant laborers, welfare dependent families, and homo
sexuals) who could not get the privacy and related autonomy they wanted, and
those (sex workers and pop-culture celebrities) who care less about their own
privacy than others think they should. U.S. moral and legal traditions have
always regulated the ''wanted gaze" as well as the "unwanted gaze," never
permitting individuals to be the absolute sole arbiters of their own privacy.
The just regulation of the "wanted gaze" is anything but a problem of the
ancient past. It is a problem addressed to an extent-perhaps to an inadequate,
unjust extent-by. current law and norms. Yet, in a society that stresses the
importance of individual choice and seeks to allow individual preferences to
dictate conduct and lifestyle, regulation of the "wanted gaze" is practiced but
automatically suspect. Liberals, keeping to our own core principles, know we
can only accept a limited number of reasons for regulating privacy. Liberals
cannot appeal unblinking to the ideal of the common good as a just constraint
on individual choice-a move open to Arnitai Etzioni and the communitar
ians.21 The most controversial justification for privacy regulation and privacy
choice perceived within modern western liberal democracies is the felt need to
enforce collective morality or the moral tone of society. More consistent with
classical liberalism are reasons relating to the felt need to prevent serious harm
to others, and, in the case of the young or incompetent, harm to self. The
paternalistic Children's Online Privacy Protection Ace2 is arguably justifiable to

20. Polly Sprenger, Sun on Privacy: "Get Over It," WiRED NEws (Jan. 26, 1999) (quoting Scott
McNealy's remark, "You have zero privacy anyway, get over it."), at http://www.wired.com/news/politics/
0,1283, 17538,00.html.
21. See generally AMITA I ETZJONI, THE LIMITS OF PRIVACY (1999) (providing communitarian defense
of measures to protect the common good even if doing so requires interference with individual
privacy).
22. 15 u.s.c. §§ 6501-6506 (2000).
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prevent children from hurting themselves by thoughtless waiver of informa
tional privacy. No federal law is similarly designed to prevent adults from
hurting themselves by thoughtless waivers of informational privacy. Yet bans on
public nudity are sometimes justified by concerns about harm that may befall
adult victims of criminal predators and public health crises. Thus, we suppress
the sex workers' "wanted gazes," among other reasons, in the name of public
health and crime control. Pornography and obscenity laws restricting the ability
of consensual adults to create, distribute, and use sexually explicit materials are
controversial with libertarian purists precisely because those laws seem to be
addressed solely to the demands of prudish morality and the moral tone of the
community.
V. ROSEN'S LIBERTARIAN CRITIQUE OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT LAW
Jeffrey Rosen's focus on "unwanted gazes" (and correlative neglect of perni
cious "wanted gazes") is a function of his civil libertarianism, a political
orientation he announces in the final chapter of his book. He is not the
traditionalist briefly suggested by his seeming endorsement of the nonvolunta
rist dimensions in Jewish law. On the contrary, Rosen defends privacy by
appealing to two great liberal principles, embraced to a degree by Democrats,
Republicans, and independents alike: first, the principle of individuality; and
second, the principle of limited government. Privacy norms maintain social
boundaries that allow individuals to be the individuals they choose to be, and
that keep government properly limited, tolerant, and nontotalitarian. The social
boundaries we and our society erect in the name of privacy help in the
formation of healthy relationships of varied intimacy and distance. It is impor
tant that there be some people who know us extremely well, such as family,
friends, and mental health providers, and others who know us less well and
leave us peacefully and respectfully alone.
Rosen's commitments to individuality and limited government may explain
why, when he does tum his attention to the problem of pernicious ''wanted
gazes," it is to condemn laws inviting voluntary disclosures that harm dignity
and constrain individual expression. Rosen attacks the federal law of sexual
harassment because he believes it is an unwarranted governmental interference
with individual privacy interests. The law invites alleged victims of harassment
to speak openly about the "private" conduct of others in the workplace in
proceedings that may also require them to disclose their own "private" conduct.
In The Unwanted Gaze and in a subsequent article in The New Republic,Z3
Jeffrey Rosen condemned the law of sexual harassment in the workplace as an
example of the unwanted gaze of government, employers, and co-workers
undermining the dignity of workers. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
prohibits employers from discriminating on the basis of sex and certain other

23. Jeffrey Rosen, Fall

of Private Man, NEw REPusuc, June 12, 2000, at 22·29.
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traits. 24 Current Equal Employment Opportunity Commission regulations25 and
Title VII jurisprudence endorsed by the Supreme Court,26 treat sexual harass
ment as employment discrimination. Victims of sexual harassment have a
remedy under Title VII for employment discrimination when employers are
responsible for either "hostile environment" harassment or "quid pro quo"
harassment. 27 Title VII has been under intense scrutiny by legal scholars, some
of whom say Title VII sexual harassment law clashes with rights of free speech
and worker privacy.28 In like vein, Rosen believes Title VII appropriately
provides a remedy for quid pro quo harassment. Rosen argues, however, that the
"hostile environment" doctrine invites unduly extensive scrutiny of the personal
lives of workers. Rosen suggests, in effect, that employee accountability for
interpersonal misconduct at work is more vital when the consequence of
misconduct is loss of employment opportunity than when the consequence of
misconduct is the creation of an inhospitable workplace.
Feminists who believe it imperative to be able to speak openly and freely about the
injuries suffered "in private" and concerning "the private" will be reluctant to embrace
Rosen's analysis of Title VII jurisprudence. Symbolized by the slogan that "the
personal is political," feminists advocate inviting the public to gaze into traditional
spheres of personal, sexual, and domestic life in order to discern and address subordi
nation, discrimination, and inequality?9 Title Vll plaintiffs alleging sexual harassment
believe the goal of accountability for interpersonal conduct can trump the goal of
protecting perpetrators from the unwanted gaze. Plaintiffs want the very gaze that, for
alleged perpetrators, is unwanted.

24. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2000) ("It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an
employer ... to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against
any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,
because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; ... ).
"

25. 29 C.ER § 1604.11 (a) (2000), defines sexual harassment as
[u]nwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical conduct
of a sexual nature ... when ( 1) submission to such conduct is made either explicitly or
implicitly a term o r condition of an individual's employment, (2) submission to or rejection of
such conduct by an individual is used as the basis for employment decisions affecting such
individual, or (3) such conduct has the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an
individual's work performance or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working
environment.
See also EEOC Policy Guidance on Current Issues of Sexual Harassment, 3 EEOC Compl. Man.

(BNA) No. N-915-050, at 4031.4033 (Mar.19, 1990).
26. See Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986) (recognizing sexual harassment as a
form of employment discrimination, and hostile environment as a form of sexual harassment actionable
under Title vm.

27. Id.
28. See generally Symposium, Strengthening Title VII: 1997-1998 Sexunl Harassment Jurispru
dence, 7 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 671 (1999).
29. For a comprehensive discussion of the feminist critique of privacy, see Debra Morris, Privacy,
Privation, Perversity: Toward New Representation of the PersoMl, 25 SiGNs 323 (2000) .

THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL

2022

[Vol. 89:2013

V II. PRIVACY AND ACCOUNTABILITY
Can there be both privacy at work and accountability for wrongful interper
sonal conduct at work? Both would seem to be important. We need privacy at
work. Many employees are spending well over forty hours a week in offices and
other workplaces. Rosen argues that privacy at work should include "backstage
areas where people can joke, let down their hair, and form intimate relationships
free from official scrutiny."30 It is hard for anyone who values privacy to
altogether oppose Rosen's idea of a "backstage." We cannot be "on stage" all
the time. Rosen firmly believes that what happens backstage should remain in
that context.
Rosen brings a contextualist accent to his libertarian case for privacy. Individu
als are entitled to privacy to avoid having their words and deeds taken out of
context. Invasions of privacy cause harm by taking information about personal
matters out of the intimate contexts where they belong, and thrusting them
before the public eye for what inevitably turns into prurient, curious distortions
and misunderstandings that limit our freedom and cause us shame, humiliation,
and embarrassment.31 Indeed some gay people may have preferred the closet if
they had known that information about their sexuality would turn their meaning
ful same-sex relationships into tawdry items for gossip and misplaced moralism.
I believe the desire to avoid having his conduct interpreted out of context led
Oscar Wilde to the deception and lawsuits that ultimately led to his incarcera
tion and premature death. 32 For Rosen, employers and their workers should not
be generally accountable for the words and behaviors that fall short of crimes or
torts and that deny no one employment opportunity.
The general point Rosen makes-through the metaphor of the "backstage"
about the importance of privacy at work is appealing. However, sexual harass

ment law arose because women were being routinely, and as a matter of course,

forced "backstage" for unwanted jokes, informality, and intimacy when they
wanted to remain "center stage" in their professional roles. Men and women
who complain of sexual harassment have done so in part because a boss,
supervisor, or co-worker forced them to endure words or behavior more suitable

for a date, kitchen table, or sleazy motel room.

One of the primary purposes of the U.S. law of sexual harassment is to
improve economic opportunities for previously excluded women by making
employers and employees more accountable for sex-related interpersonal miscon
duct in the workplace.33 Workers are made more accountable by holding their

30.
31.
32.
33.

RosEN, supra note I, at 89.
See id. at 8-9.
See Anita L. Allen, Lying to Protect Privacy, 44 VILL. L. REv. 161, 178 (1999).
There have been many efforts to explain what is wrong with sexual harassment. See, e.g.,

Katherine Franke, W hats Wrong with Sexual Harassment, 49 STA.'I. L. REv. 691, 693 (1997) (explain
ing that sexual harassment is wrong because it embodies gender stereotypes, rather than because it
would not have taken place but for the plaintiff's sex, because it is sexual in nature, or because it
sexually subordinates women to men); see also Kathy Abrams, The New Jurisprwlence of Sexual
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employers liable. As a practical matter, the law of sexual harassment requires
that victims of harassment be willing to make public otherwise private facts
about themselves and the perpetrators of the harassment. From the point of view
of a person victimized by harassment who brings a formal sexual harassment
charge, the resultant privacy losses are more or less voluntary. The gaze . is
wanted, if only reluctantly, as a cost of legal vindication. From the point of view
of persons accused of sexual harassment, sexual harassment law constitutes an
"unwanted gaze"-an invasion of their privacy-as their words and actions,
some pertaining to their intimate lives, are turned into objects of legal scrutiny.
Numerous theorists have argued that the privacy of men and the spheres of
life they control are overvalued, thus shortchanging women. Feminists have
argued that only by shining a bright light into traditionally private sanctuaries
can justice be done. "Unwanted gazes" must become "wanted gazes." Professor
Anita Hill became a heroine to some feminists because-at considerable cost to
her own privacy and that of Justice Clarence Thomas, their families, and their
friends--'-she opened the door to governmental, media, and public scrutiny of
the sex-related tastes and habits of a prominent judge?4 Although Paula Jones
failed to become a heroine of the feminist movement, she also jettisoned sexual
privacy, inviting the gaze of the public in order to pursue lucrative legal claims
against President Bill Clinton. 35 Both women believed the powerful men they
sought to expose had behaved badly toward them, and that the men should be
made publicly accountable in spite of, and because of, the sexual nature of the
alleged interpersonal misconduct.
Rosen argues that the law of sexual harassment is "excessive." It is a
heavy-handed way to attack a problem that is better seen as a privacy-norm
breach than gender discrimination, he says.36 Rosen offers a concrete proposal
for minimizing the unwanted gazes brought on by sexual harassment law. He
suggests jettisoning the hostile environment doctrine and encouraging women
whose work environments are filled with demeaning sexual innuendo, offensive

Harassment, 83 CoRNELL L. REv. 1169, 1218 (1998) (noting that "sexual harassment disadvantages its
victims as workers," and "may compel choices that trade professional advantage for a more secure or
peaceful environment").
34. See CATHERINE MAcKrnNoN, ONLY WoRDS 64-68 (1993). Compare ANITA HILL, SPEAKING TRUTH
To PowER (1997) (describing her testimony in Congressional hearings on the nomination of Justice
Clarence Thomas and its impact), with Michael Wines, The Thomas Nomination: Compelling Evidence
on Both Sides, but Only One Can Be Telling the Truth, N.Y. TIMES, October 15, 1991, at A20.
35. President William Jefferson Clinton settled for $850,000 a lawsuit brought by Paula Jones, who
claimed that he took her from her work, asked for sex, and exposed himself to her in a Little Rock hotel
room. Following his acquittal in impeachment proceedings in the Senate, Judge Susan Webber Wright
of the federal district court in Little Rock issued an order on April 12, 1999, holding Clinton in
contempt of court for "false, misleading and evasive" testimony about his relationship with former
W hite House intern Monica Lewinsky in his deposition in the Jones lawsuit. See Excerpts from the
Judges Ruling, N.Y. TIMES, April 13, 1999. at A20.
36. But see Anita Bernstein, Treating Sexual Harassment with Respect, Il l HARV. L. REv. 445, 450
(1997) (arguing that hostile environment sexual harassment is a type of incivility or disrespect that
merits a Title vn remedy).
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language, leering, and overtures to bring tort actions for invasion of privacy
against responsible offenders. In this way, "highly offensive" privacy-invading
sexual harassment will have a remedy, but the more merely offensive, tasteless,
and privacy-invading sexual harassment will not.37 Nor should it, Rosen be
lieves. Minor breaches of social norms and etiquette should not be elevated to
the level of legal wrongs, and they cannot be without inviting unwanted gazes.
Rosen's argument presupposes that employers and supervisors will face so
few plausible suits for hostile environment under the privacy-invasion rubrics of
tort law, that they will be able to relax surveillance of e-mail, intimate relation
ships among coworkers, and other workplace conduct. Employers anticipating
what are really breaches of taste and etiquette will not feel compelled to
aggressively monitor workplace speech and conduct, Rosen concludes. The
"wanted gaze" of accountability for interpersonal conduct will be narrowed by
blinders of limited liability. But what if employers remain worried about norms?
And what if the number of tort actions match the number of Title VII actions for
hostile environment?
Rosen suggests that an otherwise respected, upwardly mobile professional
worker like Professor Anita Hill, faced with a boss who likes to describe dirty
movies and make sexual innuendos, will have no Title VII claim, and perhaps
no good privacy tort claim either. A victim of a single act of sexual impropriety,
an otherwise respected worker like Paula Jones, would have no Title VII claim
either, though her tort claim might pass muster under the tort liability standard.
According to Rosen, "[I]f and when Bill Clinton exposed himself to Paula Jones
in a Little Rock hotel room, the injury she suffered may be better described as
an invasion of privacy than as a form of gender discrimination."38 Clinton's
alleged invasion of Jones's privacy objectified, belittled, and insulted Paula
Jones, according to Rosen; and such leering and exposure is wrong for those
reasons, not most problematically on account of sex inequality. If Clinton had
been a woman, and Jones a man, we would more naturally think of such
behavior as a breach of etiquette than as sex discrimination, Rosen suggests. As
a privacy invasion complained about in a tort action, exposing one's penis to a
stranger simply because one finds her attractive, or prattling about pubic hairs
and pornography could be deemed "highly offensive" and actionable--or not.
Of course, one might object to the "wanted gaze" of accountability to victims
of sexual harassment on the basis of concern for the victims' privacy. Paula
Jones and Anita Hill may have deserved privacy, even if President Clinton and
Justice Thomas did not. Indeed, feminists have often expressed concern that,
ironically, victims of sexual harassment, like victims of rape, can remedy

37. Commentators question whether even Title VII has provided an effective remedy in hostile
environment cases. See, e.g., Susan Estrich, Sex at Work, 43 STAN. L. REv. 813, 856 (1991) (observing
that courts were "slower to recognize hostile environments in the first instance, and are now more
reluctant to impose liability for them").
38. RosEN, supra note 1, at 21.
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privacy-invading wrongs only by giving up more privacy.39 However, Rosen's
attack against Title VII reflects his voluntarist libertarian impulses rather than
feminist or nonvoluntarist impulses. Legal liability for sexual harassment must
be restricted, he argues, because it leads to unwanted scrutiny of private life that
distorts through decontextualization. Rosen objects to the "wanted gaze" of
victims of sexual harassment on the basis of concern about the perpetrators. His
perpetrator focus is redeemed somewhat by the fact that every victim is, in
theory, also a perpetrator, so vulnerable are we all to breaches of social norms.
We are all human.
Still, Rosen's criticism of hostile environment discrimination is troubling. We
are all human, but some of us are female humans. Rosen's polite attacks on
feminism and the law of sexual harassment in the workplace are no doubt the
most controversial aspects of his book. As feminists have emphasized, it is
important to give up some privacy-as liberalism has defined it-to get protec
tion and access.40 We ought not want too much privacy for ourselves and others
because privacy can shield neglect and violence. Rosen believes that, in re
sponse to feminism, our society now calls attention to sexual intimacies in ways
that are hurtful and harmful to legitimate privacy interests.
Many forms of what is called sexual harassment are invasions of privacy. As

I argued a dozen years ago, the invasion of privacy torts should be employed
against sexual harassment in the workplace.41 I disagree, though, with Rosen's
non sequitur that the hostile environment doctrine should be dropped from Title

VII jurisprudence in the interest of workplace privacy.42 Rosen's argument
against the hostile environment doctrine depends critically on an ability to
clearly distinguish quid pro quo harassment from hostile environment harass
ment. A semantic distinction can be made between the two; but, at root, liability
for both is premised on a policy decision to combat unjust female exclusion
from the workplace. The hostile environment doctrine reflects the judgment of

the courts and fair-employment lawyers that the ability of women to be at work
rather than at home depends both upon employers' willingness to hire and
promote women who want to work outside the home, and upon women's
willingness to endure working outside the home.
Once upon a time, men and women both understood that a woman's decision
to enter the workforce was a decision to subject herself both to the frustration
that comes from having one's potential and accomplishments undervalued, and
to the indignities of sexual harassment. A working woman had two choices: be a
realistic tough cookie and take the crap male co-workers and bosses dished out,
or be a crybaby and go home. For the women who "had to work," the option oi
going home did not exist. Women in food service and clerical positions had i1

39. MACKINNON, supra note 34, at 66.
40. See Anita

L. Allen, Privacy, in A

COMPANION

TO

FEMINIST PHILOSOPHY 456, 456-465 (Alison M

Jaggar & Iris Marion Young eds., 1998)
41. See A NITA L. ALLEN, UNEASY ACCESS: PRIVACY FOR WOMEN
42. See Rosen, supra note 23.
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bad. Women who tried "male" occupations had it really bad. Three decades ago,
husbands took a certain pride in the fact their wives did not have to earn money
in order for the family to survive. But they also slept easier knowing that their
wives would not have to leave home only to become objects of leering,
uninvited sexual overtures, and other forms of sexual harassment.
Professor Rosen believes the position of women in the workplace is elevated
and secure today, partly due to Title VII's ban on overt discriminatory exclusion
based on gender and its ban on quid pro quo harassment. He seems to assume
that incivility does not typically function to deny women the economic opportu
nity that is a promised civil right. Yet, when women who have a choice about
whether and where they work outside the home are making their choices, those
choices are being wrongfully constrained by beliefs about, among other things,
the amount of unchecked sexual harassment they are likely to face in various
settings.43 To jettison the hostile environment doctrine would be to fail to
understand that quid pro quo harassment and hostile environment harassment
still work in tandem to deny women the equal employment opportunity prom
ised by Title VII's vision of civil rights.
It is discrimination on the basis of sex for employers, managers, and co
workers who hold sway over economic fates to repeatedly demean, humiliate,
or embarrass employees because of their gender through sexual overtures and
innuendos. Rosen argues that law is often less effective than social norms and
technological solutions, which can achieve the same policy result without
threatening the privacy of innocent people in the process. In short, the legally
buttressed "wanted gaze" sometimes should be rebuffed in favor of nonlegal
"norms" to protect people from "unwanted gazes." This may be true, but Rosen
has failed to provide evidence or persuasive arguments indicating that women
would not more frequently self-exclude in favor of domesticity or stereotypical
"women's work" under the truncated Title VII regime he paints than under the
current regime.
Just how should people behave at work? Although Rosen sees privacy
invading sexual harassment as a kind of incivility that breaches norms of
etiquette, he is too laissez-faire liberal in the end to proffer idealized concep
tions of good conduct and relations between men and women as such. Wendy
Shalit, whose take on privacy is less voluntarist than Rosen's, is a fellow critic
of contemporary sexual harassment laws, but one who dwells unashamedly on
the virtues: modesty for women and honor for men. She objects to sexual
harassment laws on the ground that they address the outer man of action rather
than the inner man of conscience and virtue. She wants men to feel an
obligation of male honor to treat women in accordance with "the ideal relation

43. Cf Gillian K. Hadfield, Rational Women: A Test for Sex-Based Harassment, 83 CAL L. REv.
1151, 1156 (1995) (rejecting "tort-like treatment of sex-based harassment claims," and defining sexual
harassment as "sex-based non-job-related workplace conduct that would lead a rational woman to alter
her workplace behavior-such as refusing overtime, projects, or travel that would put her in contact
with a harasser, requesting a transfer, or quitting-if she could do so at little or no cost to her").
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between them and women."44 Ideally, men treat all women as ladies-with
respect and without debasement, she insists.
The choice that must be made is between a legal regime that provides more
meaningful employment opportunity or a legal regime that provides more
privacy and uncoerced virtue. Shalit 's "retro"-chic book is evidence of a writer
seeking (in vain, I believe) in sexual modesty and manly honor a weapon
against rampant sexual harassment. Rosen's advice to a young woman con
cerned about hostile environment sexual harassment would be that she try to be
a tough cookie, advocate social norms, and wait until things gets bad enough to
bring a tort suit. My advice: Forget the false veil of sexual chastity; do not hold
your breath for the resurgence of manly honor; and cooperate with efforts that
may include responsible, privacy-sensitive employer monitoring, enforceable
conduct codes designed to minimize sexual harassment45 and other forms of
gender-related misconduct not related to sexuality as such.46
Roseri has decried the "fall of the private man," represented by the direction
of current sexual harassment law. He has thereby placed himself in a camp
occupied by other scholarly libertarians.47 However, let us not forget that there
are two dimensions to the "fall of the private man" and the destruction of

44. SHALIT, supra note 5, at 102, 1 47-48.
45. A critic of the privacy implications of certain forms of employer monitoring and conduct codes,
such as forcing employees to sign dating waivers, need not advocate abandoning hostile environment
law. See, e.g., Niloofar Nejat-Bina, Employers as Vigilant Chaperones Armed with Dating Waivers: The
Intersection of Unwelcomeness and Employer Liability in Hostile Work Environment Sexual Harass
ment Law, 20 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 325, 327 ( 1 999) ("[C]urrent requirements for hostile work
environment claims under Title VII are leading employers to take . . . undesirable and unrealis
tic . . . role[s] in consensual office relationships," but "recently elucidated employer liability standards
for hostile work environment claims are proper . . . . "). Nejat-Bina argued that alternatives to dating
waivers include developing and distributing clear policies, educating workers about improprieties and
policies, implementing effective grievance procedures and educating employees about their use, and
finally, instituting employer measures to end immediately any ongoing harassment. ld. at 358-59; see
also Jennifer L. Dean, Employer Regulation of Employee Personal Relationships, 76 B.U. L. REv.
1 05 1 , 1 05 3 ( 1996) (defending employer restriction of employee personal relationships, but urging that
dating outside of work and by persons not in supervisor-subordinate relationships not be a basis for
discharge); Kathleen M. Hallinan, Invasion of Privacy or Protection Against Sexual Harassment:
Co-Employee Dating and Employer Liability, 26 CowM. J.L. & Soc. PRoss. 435, 464 ( 1 999) ("If
properly constructed, co-employee dating policies will . . . protect[] the privacy interests of employ
ees.").
A critic of the First Amendment implications of employer monitoring and conduct codes need not
advocate abandoning hostile environment law either. See, e.g., Deborah Epstein, Can a "Dumb Ass
Woman " Achieve Equality in the Workplace ? Running the Gauntlet of Hostile Environment Harassing
Speech, 84 GEo. L.J. 399, 45 1 ( 1 999) ("[T]he current formulation of hostile environment harassment
[which restricts the laws that regularly reach to the most extreme, persistent, and unwelcome forms o f
workplace harassment] strikes the best possible balance between the fundamental interests of equal
opportunity and free speech thus far articulated.").
46. See Vicki Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, 107 YALE L J
.

.

1683, 1 687 ( 1 998)

(arguing that hostile environment law has been overly sexualized; some of the conduct that makes
workplaces hostile to women "has little or nothing to do with sexuality but everything to do with
gender").
47. See, e.g., David E. Bernstein, Sex Discrimination Laws Versus Civil Libenies, 1 999 U . Cm.
LEGAL F. 1 3 3 (arguing that constitutional civil liberties should triumph over sex discrimination laws).
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privacy. The fall that occurs because other people do not respect a man 's
privacy-the "unwanted gaze"-is one dimension. The fall that occurs because
a man does not respect his own privacy-the "wanted gaze"-is the second.
The "unwanted gaze" and the "wanted gaze" equally lead to the destruction of
privacy. When a man seeking sex in a professional setting exposes his penis and
sexual fantasies to an arbitrarily selected strange woman, we discern a lack of
respect for his own privacy; as well as his lack of respect for hers . The private
man at work who cannot keep his zipper up or who indulges in uncivil
conversation about his sexual life, his medical problems, or his personal finan
cial woes is hardly a private man at all. We need to find a way to address the
"fall of the private man,"48 without precipitating the fall of the working
woman.49 Jettisoning hostile environment law is not clearly the way to go
about it.

48. Rosen, supra note 23, at 22-29.
49. Many defend, for example, state laws that protect workers' off-the-job privacy rights to socialize
with co-workers and to engage in high risk and unhealthy activities. See generally Terry Morehead
Dworkin, It 's My Life-Leave Me Alone: Off- the-Job Employee Associational Privacy Rights, 35

Bus. LJ. 47 ( 1 999).
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